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In May of this year, a divided Supreme Court cast
doubt on whether Miranda imposes an obligation on
police when they question arrested suspects.
Miranda’s
Demise?
Steven D. Clymer
Miranda v. Arizona1 has been a prominent fixture
of the American criminal justice system, as well as
police television shows and movies, for more than a
third of a century. And when, amid considerable
fanfare, the Supreme Court in June 2000 an-
nounced its decision in Dickerson v. United States,2
it appeared that Miranda would retain that status
for the foreseeable future. In Dickerson, a surpris-
ingly large 7–2 majority settled a long-standing
debate about the constitutional legitimacy of
Miranda, holding that the Miranda rules are firmly
grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimina-
tion clause.
But now, a mere three years
later, Miranda’s fortunes have
shifted dramatically. In May of
this year, a divided Supreme
Court cast doubt on whether
Miranda imposes an obligation
on police when they question
arrested suspects. And, in the
coming Term, the Court will decide two cases that
further will determine whether Miranda will con-
tinue to play a significant role in regulating police
interrogation practices. There is a good chance that
by this time next year, with tacit approval from the
Court, many police departments will spend more
time and energy devising methods of circumvent-
ing the Miranda rules than following them. In
order to understand why Miranda’s future looks so
precarious, it is helpful to begin by briefly review-
ing its past.3
Miranda to Dickerson:
A Very Brief History
The 1966 Miranda decision was a tour de force in
constitutional interpretation. After having experi-
mented with both the Due Process Clause and the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as means of
controlling pernicious police interrogation prac-
tices, the Court, in Miranda, turned to the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause. The Court
determined that custodial police interrogation, by
its nature, forces arrested suspects to answer ques-
tions. It concluded that suspects’ answers to such
questioning are inherently “compelled” and thus
inadmissible in criminal prosecutions by virtue of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. But, the Miranda Court struck
a compromise of sorts, giving police an opportu-
nity to “dispel” the compulsion and thus obtain
admissible responses to their questions. To do so,
police had to give the now-famous warnings and
obtain from suspects affirmative waivers of their
“rights” to remain silent and consult with counsel.
If suspects asserted rather than waived their rights,
police were supposed to honor those invocations by
terminating interrogation.
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In the decades following Miranda, the Court
refined the new doctrine. Many decisions addressed
predictable issues: what constitutes “custody” and
“interrogation” for purposes of triggering the warn-
ings and waiver requirements;4 what sorts of
responses are sufficient to qualify as waivers of
rights;5 and whether police are foreclosed from
making additional efforts to secure waivers once
suspects invoke their right to counsel or to remain
silent.6 But, two more fundamental interpretative
issues soon arose, ones that would play a critical
role in determining the meaning and operation of
Miranda. One issue involved the constitutional
legitimacy of Miranda; the other affected police
compliance with the Miranda rules.
The first issue surfaced in a series of cases begin-
ning in 1974 with Michigan v. Tucker,7 in which
the Court began to describe Miranda as if it were
something less than a constitutional requirement.
In those cases, the Court explained that Miranda
“sweeps more broadly” than the Constitution and
requires suppression even when police do not use
constitutionally-prohibited compulsion during
questioning. The Court seemed to have concluded
that the secrecy of the police interrogation process
and the inevitable swearing contests at suppression
hearings between police officers and suspects about
what had occurred during questioning made it
prohibitively difficult for courts to determine
whether police actually had coerced a suspect into
answering questions. As a result, Miranda’s bright
line rule—suppression of statements absent affir-
mative proof of police compliance with the
warning and waiver requirements—was a necessary
prophylaxis.
Whatever the merits of that reasoning, the
Court’s description of Miranda as extending be-
yond the boundaries of the Constitution presented
a problem. If the Miranda doctrine sweeps more
broadly than the Constitution, then some viola-
tions of Miranda are not violations of the
Constitution. But, if a Miranda violation is not a
constitutional violation, by what authority can the
Supreme Court require the suppression in state
court proceedings of a suspect’s statements taken
in violation of only the prophylactic Miranda
rules? And, even if the Court’s supervisory power
permits it to require such a rule in federal courts,
why can’t Congress overrule it, as it attempted to
do when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute
permitting the introduction of voluntary confes-
sions in federal courts even absent compliance with
the Miranda rules? These questions about the
constitutional legitimacy of Miranda triggered a
decades-long debate, one that was not resolved
until the Dickerson decision.
The second issue, police compliance, arose in a
series of Supreme Court decisions that addressed
the consequences of violations of the Miranda
rules —situations in which police question an
arrested suspect without first properly advising
him of his rights (“failure-to-warn violations”) or
continue to question an arrested suspect after his
assertion of his right to silence or counsel (“failure-
to-honor violations”). Although Miranda had held
that the prosecution is forbidden from introducing
statements resulting from such violations in its
case-in-chief, the Court left open the question
whether prosecutors can use such statements to
impeach defendants who give inconsistent trial
testimony. Likewise, Miranda did not determine
whether prosecutors can admit evidentiary fruits of
statements that police obtain by violating the
Miranda rules, such as physical evidence or testi-
mony from witnesses identified in suspects’
statements.
In two post-Miranda cases, the Court deter-
mined categorically that prosecutors are free to
impeach testifying defendants with inconsistent
statements made following either failure-to-warn
The Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court
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Questions about the constitutional legitimacy of
Miranda triggered a decades-long debate, one
that was not resolved until the Dickerson decision.
or failure-to-honor Miranda violations.8 Although,
to date, the Court has been less categorical on the
fruits issue, it held in one case that the prosecution
could call a witness whom police had identified
only because of a statement that a suspect gave
without having received proper Miranda warnings.9
Similarly, in another case, the Court held that
when police first obtained a statement by question-
ing an arrested suspect without Miranda warnings,
a later statement that the suspect made following
Miranda warnings was not tainted by the first
statement.10
These impeachment and fruits decisions do
more than determine what sort of evidence the
prosecution can admit at trial. They create affirma-
tive incentives for police to violate the Miranda
rules. If an earlier un-warned statement does not
taint a suspect’s later, post-Miranda statement,
police have reason to question a suspect without
advising him of his rights to
silence and counsel. Such ques-
tioning may increase the chances
of obtaining a statement which,
although inadmissible in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, can
serve as a “beachhead.” By later
warning the suspect of his rights, police can “cure”
the earlier violation and likely persuade the suspect,
who already has “let the cat out of the bag,” to
repeat the statement. Under the Court’s approach,
the second statement is freely admissible.
In addition, police have little reason to stop
questioning when a suspect invokes his right to
silence or counsel. Honoring the assertion of rights
forecloses the chance of obtaining any statement;
dishonoring the assertion can lead to acquisition of
a statement that, although inadmissible in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, can be used to impeach
the suspect at trial (and perhaps deter the defen-
dant from testifying at all) or aid in discovery of
other evidence. Indeed, in recent years, a number
of police officers and departments have chosen to
deliberately violate the Miranda rules because of
these evidentiary incentives. Supporters of Miranda
have criticized both the Court for creating the
incentives and the police for acting on them.11
There seemed to be a connection between these
two issues—the scope of the Miranda exclusionary
rule and Miranda’s constitutional legitimacy. When
the government compels a statement from a person
outside the context of custodial interrogation,
thereby triggering the protections of the self-
incrimination clause, the prosecution is forbidden
from making any use of the statement in a criminal
prosecution of the person who made the statement.
For example, in the context of grand jury investiga-
tions, witnesses sometime refuse to answer
questions by asserting their Fifth Amendment
privilege. The prosecution can overcome that asser-
tion, and compel answers, by obtaining a grant of
immunity. But, although an immunized witness
has to answer questions or face contempt of court
sanctions, the prosecution cannot use a statement
compelled by an immunity grant in any way if it
later prosecutes the witness. Thus, the prosecution
cannot introduce the immunized statement in its
case-in-chief against the witness-turned-defendant,
and, in contrast to the rules that apply in the
Miranda context, cannot use it to impeach incon-
sistent trial testimony or introduce any evidentiary
fruits of the statement. There was reason to believe
that the more limited exclusionary sanction in the
Miranda context was an outgrowth of the Court’s
characterization of Miranda as only a prophylactic
rule. The Court seemed to have concluded that
violations of the merely prophylactic Miranda rules
required a less drastic response than the Fifth
Amendment privilege itself required in other con-
texts. Thus, when the Supreme Court granted
review in Dickerson—to consider whether Congress
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had the authority to overrule Miranda—it ap-
peared that the Court was poised to confront both
the legitimacy issue and questions regarding the
scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule.
Dickerson v. United States:
Affirmation or Only a Brief Reprieve?
In 1968, two years after the Court decided
Miranda, Congress attempted to overturn it. It did
so by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute requir-
ing federal courts to admit defendants’ post-arrest
statements as long as they were voluntarily made.
Under Section 3501, a failure to advise an arrested
suspect of his rights was a factor to be considered in
assessing voluntariness but, in contrast to the
Miranda doctrine, did not require suppression.
Although Section 3501 has been available since
1968, the Department of Justice rarely argued in
court that it trumped Miranda. In Dickerson, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte relied
on Section 3501 to reverse a district court’s order
suppressing a confession that an FBI agent ob-
tained without Miranda warnings. The appellate
court ruled that the confession, because it was
voluntary, was admissible despite the failure to
follow Miranda. When the Supreme Court chose
to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision, it was
obvious that it would resolve the long-standing
debate about Miranda’s legitimacy.
At first blush, the result in Dickerson appeared
to be a stunning victory for Miranda’s defenders.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who long ago had touched off the legitimacy de-
bate in his opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, seven
members of the Court rejected the notion that
Congress could overrule Miranda. Rather, the
Court held that Miranda was a constitutionally-
based rule, resting firmly on the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The Court had resolved the debate in
Miranda’s favor, making clear that it Miranda’s
constitutional pedigree was pure.
But, upon closer inspection, the Dickerson opin-
ion cast a shadow on Miranda’s future. First, no
member of the Court expressed any real enthusi-
asm for Miranda. Rather than extolling the virtues
of the Miranda doctrine or its importance in regu-
lating police interrogation practices, the Court’s
opinion simply noted that it had in the past de-
scribed and treated Miranda as if it were a
constitutionally-based decision and that the Court
was reluctant, for purposes of stare decisis, to
change course, “[w]hether or not we would agree
with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule,
were we addressing the issue in the first in-
stance.”12 Remarkably, the Court seemed unwilling
to endorse even the most basic tenets of Miranda,
ascribing them instead to the Miranda Court. For
example, the Dickerson Court stated that the
“Miranda Court” had concluded that the warning
and waiver requirements were necessary to over-
come the pressures of custodial interrogation, but
never expressed agreement with either this or any
other premise of the Miranda decision. Similarly,
Dickerson was noticeably devoid of any concurring
opinion extolling the importance of Miranda as a
means of regulating police interrogation.
Second, contrary to the views of many com-
mentators that the legitimacy question was linked
to the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule, the
Dickerson Court appeared to see no inconsistency
between a constitutionally-based Miranda doctrine
and a watered-down exclusionary sanction. Al-
though the Dickerson Court did not address the
scope of the exclusionary sanction directly, it de-
scribed with approval some of its decisions
permitting impeachment with statements taken in
violation of Miranda and the admission of fruits of
such statements. Thus, while the Court made clear
that Miranda has a constitutional foundation, it
appeared to leave intact the incentives for police to
violate the Miranda rules.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the
Court used language suggesting that even if
Miranda has a constitutional foundation, the foun-
dation is not as solid as Miranda’s supporters
would like. In several places, the Dickerson Court
described Miranda as a rule of admissibility, not a
rule governing police conduct. Coupled with the
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A violation only occurs if and when a compelled
statement is admitted into evidence, not when
it is compelled.
Court’s lack of enthusiasm for Miranda and its
willingness to create incentives for police to violate
the Miranda rules, those passages set the stage for
what may be Miranda’s demise.
Miranda’s Foundation:
What Does the Privilege Require?
Miranda’s constitutional foundation, the Fifth
Amendment privilege, provides that “no person…
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” The text of the privilege
thus suggests that what it prohibits is not “compul-
sion” per se but rather the admission “in any
criminal case” of a compelled statement “against”
the person who gave it. In other words, a violation
only occurs if and when a compelled statement is
admitted into evidence, not when it is compelled.
This understanding of the privilege is significant
for at least two reasons.
First, if admission in a criminal case is necessary
for a violation to exist, then police use of compul-
sion alone to obtain a statement
does not violate the privilege. To
be sure, extreme forms of com-
pulsion would still violate
another constitutional right. The
Court has made clear that the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit police con-
duct that “shocks the conscience,” including use of
physical force, threats of force, and extreme forms
of psychological coercion during interrogation.
But, transgressions of the Miranda rules alone do
not violate due process. Thus, police would not be
liable for civil rights violations for merely failing to
follow the Miranda rules.
Second, and more significantly, if compulsion
alone does not violate the privilege, then police
commit no constitutional wrong by disregarding
the Miranda requirements. In other words, police
have no constitutional obligation to follow
Miranda. Instead, like a prosecutor deciding
whether to use the compulsion of an immunity
order, their decision is properly based on an assess-
ment of the costs and benefits of compliance and
non-compliance with the warning and waiver re-
quirements.
Last term, in Chavez v. Martinez,13 the Court
adopted the view that the privilege is a rule that
governs only admissibility, not one that operates as
a direct restraint on police conduct. Chavez in-
volved a police investigation gone tragically awry.
Martinez, a farm worker, was riding a bicycle in
Oxnard, California as two officers were investigat-
ing possible drug sales. The officers stopped
Martinez. Although a number of facts are in dis-
pute, no one doubts that Martinez struggled with
one of the officers and that the other officer, believ-
ing that Martinez had taken her partner’s service
revolver, shot Martinez, leaving him blind and
partially paralyzed. Chavez, a police supervisor who
was not involved in the stop or shooting, attempted
to interview Martinez in the hospital emergency
room despite both Martinez’s anguished pleas that
he be left alone and hospital workers’ requests that
Chavez leave. Martinez did provide some answers
in response to Chavez’s persistent questioning.
Martinez, who was never prosecuted for a crime,
sued the police department, alleging that police had
violated a number of his constitutional rights.
Among other things, Martinez claimed that
Chavez’s persistent questioning violated both his
due process rights and his “right to remain silent”
under the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Although a majority of the Supreme Court was
willing to permit Martinez to pursue his due pro-
cess claim, it rejected his view of the privilege. The
Court held that, as a general matter, admission of a
compelled statement in a criminal case is necessary
for a finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
has been violated. Martinez was never prosecuted
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The Court seems both to permit police to disregard
Miranda and to provide incentives for them to do so.
for a crime and thus his statements to Chavez were
never admitted in a criminal case against him. As a
result, under the Court’s interpretation of the
privilege, he suffered no violation of his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Chavez has profound implications for the
Miranda doctrine. If Miranda’s constitutional
foundation—the Fifth Amendment privilege—
cannot be violated without use of a compelled
statement in a criminal case, it would seem that the
same holds true for Miranda. If so, police commit
no constitutional violation if they disregard the
Miranda rules. Thus, by its decision in Chavez and
the cases in which it has permitted impeachment
use of statements taken in violation of the Miranda
rules and at least some evidentiary fruits of such
statements, the Court seems both to permit police
to disregard Miranda and to provide incentives for
them to do so.
The Future of Miranda:
Next Term and Beyond
When the Court decides the two Miranda cases on
its docket for next Term, it will make clear just
how much or how little Miranda will continue to
matter. One case, United States v. Patane,14 raises
the fruits question: whether a firearm, which police
found only as a result of a state-
ment taken in violation of the
Miranda rules, should be admis-
sible. If the Court follows what
appears to be the trend emerging
from its earlier decisions, as well
as language in a handful of both majority and con-
curring opinions, it likely will hold that even when
Miranda requires suppression of a post-arrest state-
ment, all evidentiary fruits are admissible.
The other case, Missouri v. Seibert,15 raises the
question whether more stringent suppression rules
should apply when police deliberately violate the
Miranda rules in order to take advantage of the
evidentiary benefits that the Court has created. In
Seibert, the police, hoping to obtain a fully admis-
sible Mirandized confession, deliberately refrained
from giving warnings when they started interrogat-
ing a murder suspect. Once the suspect gave a
statement, the police then warned her of her rights
and had her repeat the statement. Although, as
explained above, the Supreme Court had previ-
ously permitted the introduction of a second,
post-Miranda statement taken under similar cir-
cumstances, the lower court in Seibert held that the
second statement should be suppressed if the ini-
tial violation is deliberate. The chances are good
that the Court will reject that conclusion. First, if,
as Chavez suggests, police have no constitutional
duty to comply with the Miranda rules, then there
seems to be no reason why a decision to deliber-
ately violate the rules at the outset of the
interrogation should matter. Second, in an analo-
gous Fourth Amendment context, the Court has
held that a police officer’s subjective motivation
has no bearing on the legality of an arrest.16
Rather, as long as objective circumstances establish
probable cause to support an arrest, the officer’s
subjective motivation for making the arrest is
irrelevant. A similar approach in the Miranda
context would foreclose inquiry into whether a
police officer’s violation of Miranda is deliberate.
Third, as explained above, this Court seems un-
willing to champion extensions of Miranda.
If the Court decides Patane and Seibert as pre-
dicted, Miranda will, by the end of next year’s
Term, be reduced to a set of rules that police can
ignore deliberately when it is advantageous for
them to do so. Although Miranda still will require
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suppression in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of
any statement taken after a failure-to-warn or a
failure-to-honor violation, police almost certainly
will commit both sorts of violations with some
regularity. They often will question suspects with-
out warnings in hopes of minimizing the likelihood
of an invocation of rights, and warn only after the
suspects have given statements that they are likely
to repeat even after receiving warnings. When faced
with assertions of the rights to silence or counsel,
assertions that normally would foreclose acquisition
of any statement if the assertions were honored,
police instead will continue to question in hopes of
obtaining statements useful to impeach or as a
source of leads to other evidence.
If all of this happens, it would be perverse and
unfortunate. It would undercut the reason for
having the Miranda rules—to combat the compul-
sion inherent in police interrogation. Although the
constitutional provision upon which Miranda
rests—the privilege—may be a rule of admissibil-
ity, the Miranda Court resorted to it in hopes of
controlling what police did in the interrogation
room. The Miranda Court was willing to impose
the cost of suppression of probative evidence in
order to minimize the risk that police would use
the pressures of custodial interrogation to compel
suspects to confess against their wills. But, if, as
seems likely, the Court signals to police that they
have no constitutional duty to follow the Miranda
rules and that they can gain evidentiary benefits by
violating those rules, Miranda will not serve its
purpose. Police will refrain from giving the pres-
sure-reducing warnings, at least at the outset of
interrogation, and continue to exert pressure even
after suspects ask to remain silent or to speak with
counsel. As a result, the pressure that the Miranda
Court sought to alleviate will play a role in sus-
pects’ decisions to answer questions.
The Court could save Miranda from this fate by
rethinking the decisions in which it created the
incentives for police to violate Miranda. In Patane,
the Court could reverse course and determine that
fruits of statements taken in violation of the
Miranda rules are not admissible. Similarly, the
Court could rethink its decisions permitting im-
peachment use of such statements. If the costs of
violating the Miranda rules outweigh the benefits,
police will comply with the rules, even absent a
constitutional obligation to do so. But, given the
Court’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for Miranda,
it is unlikely that it will adopt this approach or
another that would revitalize Miranda. Instead,
Miranda soon may matter more on television
shows than it does in real-life police stations and
courtrooms.
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